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1. Introduction
Scholars have investigated the factors affecting the survival of firms from
a range of academic perspectives. One stream of research has focused on firms'
abilities to confront technological change as a primary determinant of survival
(Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986). Some scholars have seen the roots of
firms' rigidities in the face of technological change in the cultures and routines
that historically had led to their success (Maidique & Zirger, 1984; Schein, 1988;
Leonard-Barton, 1992). Requirements for different technological skills has also
been shown to affect survival (Clark, 1985; Tushman & Anderson, 1986;
Henderson & Clark, 1990). In particular, some have noted the emergence of a
dominant product design as a watershed event that drastically reduces the
probabilities of success for subsequent entrants (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975;
Utterback and Sudrez, 1993; Freeman, 1994; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). A separate
stream of research has focused upon forces external to firms that constrain
managers' abilities to change competitive and technological strategies in order to
survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Willard & Cooper, 1985). Some scholars in this
tradition have employed the tools of population ecology to identify those forces
that most powerfully affect the probabilities of survival (Hannan & Freeman,
1989; Carroll & Hannan, 1989).
While the findings of these researchers have sometimes seemed
disjointed and even at odds with one another, some integrative studies have
recently emerged suggesting how technological, cultural, managerial, and
competitive forces can interact to affect firms' probabilities of survival
(Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Jones, 1996). This
paper builds upon this integrative perspective, applying more rigorous
techniques than previously have been employed to address the question of what
factors most powerfully affect the survival of firms. It analyzes data on the firms
that comprised the rigid disk drive industry from 1975 to 1990, and suggests that
the factors which seem most closely associated with survival in this industry
may affect survival in other fast-paced industries.
The conclusion that emerges most powerfully from this study is that
variables related to managerial choice, rather than external factors in the
environment that are beyond the control of managers, were the primary factors
driving the probability of firm survival in the disk drive industry. This over-all
finding is built upon two insights, which we suggest may be applicable to other
industries besides the one studied here. The first is that the emergence of a
dominant product design indeed marks a significant watershed in the
competitive nature of an industry. In disk drives, firms that incorporated in
their product line the key elements of what became the dominant product design
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had a probability of survival that was over twice that of firms that ignored the
emergence of the dominant design. In addition, there appears to have been a
"window of opportunity" in this industry just prior to the emergence of a
dominant product design, during which entry was particularly advantageous.
Firms that entered many years before, in the stage of the industry's development
characterized by broader variety in product architecture and low volume-per-
model manufacturing, faced a higher probability of failure -- suggesting that the
capabilities and cultures they developed in that competitive environment may
not have equipped them well for the competition that characterized the industry
after the dominant design emerged.
The analytical techniques employed in this study offer a deeper insight
into what constitutes a dominant product design, and into the process by which
such product designs emerge, than previously has been available. The dominant
design for disk drives was defined by certain architectural concepts, which came
to be used by all surviving manufacturers. Within this design architecture
framework, component-level innovation (much of it radical, or competence-
destroying in character) continued at a furious pace long after the dominant
architecture became established. Certain of these component technologies
became established as standard in all products as well. Use of new components,
however, did not significantly affect the probabilities of firms' survival. Hence,
we propose that the elements of dominant design that are most salient to a
company's survival are architectural in character: they are the concepts that
define how the components within the product interact or relate to each other
(Henderson, 1988; Henderson & Clark, 1990).
The second insight relates to the risk of betting on new technologies,
versus betting on new markets. We found that in the disk drive industry, firms
whose entry strategies involved using proven component technologies in
products that facilitated the emergence of new market segments, had
significantly higher probabilities of survival than did firms that entered
established market segments with new component technologies that offered
better performance. In other words, our results suggest that entry strategies that
entail market risk (entering an emerging market with proven component
technology) may be less risky than strategies that entail technological risk
(entering an established market with new, higher-performance component
technology).'
1 Christensen (1993), p. 572, employs a very different, less analytically rigorous technique to
arrive at a similar conclusion. Using a different measure of success (and using product architecture
as a proxy for market strategy), he concludes that the posterior probabilities of success for
companies that entered new markets with proven technology was 65%. He found a 38% success
rate amongst companies that entered emerging markets using new product technologies; and an
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This paper employs a new technique, discrete survival analysis, to reach
these conclusions. It does not require the onerous assumptions inherent in the
Cox Proportional Hazard model that has most frequently been used in survival
analyses (for example Su/rez and Utterback, 1995). Discrete survival analysis
generates more robust results which can also be presented more intuitively by
allowing inclusion among other things of more time-varying covariates.
2. The Rigid Disk Drive Industry
Disk drives are magnetic information storage and retrieval devices used
with most types of computers. The principal components of most disk drives are
disks, which are substrates coated with magnetic material formatted to store
information in concentric tracks; read-write heads, which are tiny
electromagnets positioned over the spinning disks which, when energized,
orient the polarity of the magnetic material on the disk immediately beneath
them; a motor which drives the rotation of the disks; an actuator mechanism
which positions the head precisely over the track on which data is to be read or
written; and electronic circuitry and software, which control the drive's
operation and enable it to communicate with the computer. These components
work together within a particular product architecture. (More detail on how disk
drives work is provided in Appendix 1.) From the industry's inception there
have been significant technological changes both within each component and in
the architecture.
Magnetic recording and storage of digital information was pioneered with
the earliest commercial computer systems, which used reels of coated mylar tape.
IBM introduced the use of rigid rotating disks for information storage in 1956.
Although IBM's invention of a drive using flexible (floppy) disks in 1971 was
also important for the computing industry, only the industry manufacturing
rigid, or hard disk drives, is studied in this paper.
The rigid disk drive industry's history is a remarkable story of rapid
growth, market turbulence, and technology-driven "creative destruction". The
value of drives produced grew at a 35% annual rate between 1975 and 1989, when
the world-wide market size exceeded $13 billion. Of the 17 firms which
populated the industry in 1976 -- all of which were relatively large, diversified
corporations -- all had failed and exited, or had been acquired by 1990. During
this period an additional 124 firms entered the industry, and 100 of those also
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11% success rate for firms that entered established markets, regardless of whether they
employed new or proven product technologies.
failed. Some 60% of the producers remaining by 1989 had entered the industry as
start-ups since 1976. A host of factors contributed to this turbulence and high
mortality rate, as described elsewhere (Christensen, 1993). Key events that
powerfully affected the fortunes of the industry's participants, however, were
those that comprised the emergence of a dominant design for rigid disk drives.
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the industry. Note from the figure that
the total number of firms active in the industry increased steadily between 1976
and 1983, reaching more than 50 active firms in 1983. From there on, a "shake-
out" began: during the 1983-1989 period, there was a steady decrease in the
number of firms in the industry, leaving the population in 1989 in about half of
what it was in 1983 (Utterback, 1994). This can be confirmed by looking at the
entry and exit curves in the figure; note that the entry curve lies above the exit
curve for all but one year up to 1983, and that this situation is reversed for the
years following 1983. As we will see below, 1983 can also be considered the year
when most of the elements of a dominant design in disk drives fit in place and,
as theory predicts, thus represents a major milestone in the competitive
dynamics of the industry.
[insert Fig. 1 here]
3. The Evolution of a Dominant Design in Rigid Disk Drives
The data-rich technological history of the rigid disk drive industry
(Christensen, 1992; 1993) enables a more fine-grained examination of the
emergence of a dominant design than was possible in many earlier studies.
(Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Utterback and Suarez, 1994; Anderson and
Tushman, 1990). The dominant disk drive design took about 30 years to
develop. As Abernathy predicted, the dominant disk drive design was not the
result of IBM's initial radical innovation that created the world's first disk drive
in 1956. Rather, it resulted from "the weight of many innovations that tilt(ed)
the economic balance in favor of one design approach." (Abernathy, 1978).
There were, specifically, four innovations that occurred between 1973 and
1986 behind which the entire industry aligned in defining the dominant disk
drive design. Two of these, the Winchester architecture and intelligent
interfaces, were architectural in character, involving a significant re-
arrangement of the ways in which the components interacted within the design
(Henderson & Clark, 1990). The other two were components -- a rotary voice coil
actuator motor and a direct-drive pancake motor positioned at the bottom of the
spindle -- that became a standard part of every drive. The analyses reported
below show that although all four had become standard elements of 98% of all
4
drives by 1990, the architectural technologies were those that had the strongest
impact on survival probabilities.
3.1. The Winchester Architecture
The first step toward a dominant design occurred in 1973, when IBM
introduced its first drive employing the Winchester design architecture. Prior
drives generally had employed removable stacks of disks mounted on a single
spindle -- a design that had originally been developed to increase effective
capacity of drives. When the disks were full, the disk pack could be removed
and a new stack inserted. IBM's Winchester architecture sealed the entire disk
drive -- heads, disks, motors, bearings, and everything else -- inside a dust-free
housing. This enabled the heads to fly over a thousand times closer to the
surface of the disk than was possible in the removable disk pack design. The
resultant improvement in the recording density in Winchester drives made it
immediately popular. As Table 1 shows, the percentage of all drives introduced
each year that were of the Winchester design increased from 1% in 1975 to 12%
in 1980 and 88% by 1985.
[insert Table 1 here]
3.2 The Under-Spindle Pancake Motor
For about 10 years after the initial appearance of the Winchester
architecture, the transmission mechanism for spinning the disks was a fan belt
that linked an AC motor positioned in the corner of the drive's housing, with a
pulley positioned at the base of the spindle. When Seagate Technology
introduced its first "microdrive" with 5.25-inch-diameter disks in 1980, there was
no room physically within the housing for such a large motor and pulley
mechanism. Seagate's solution was to place a flat "pancake" direct-drive motor
under the base of the spindle, eliminating the belt and pulleys. This design
quickly gained currency. Table 1 shows that 43% of all drives introduced in 1982
employed pancake motors positioned beneath the spindle. This increased to 98%
by 1990.
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3.3 Rotary Voice Coil Actuator Motors
Disk drives require two motors: the spin motor described above that
drives the rotation of the disks; and an actuator motor that moves the heads into
position over the proper track on the disk. Most early drives employed a voice
coil actuator motor that works on the same principle used in sound diaphragms
of telephone handsets. As the strength of an electromagnet varies with the
amount of current flowing through it, an iron bar is moved in and out, in a very
precise, continuous motion. When Shugart Associates introduced its first drive
in 1978 it replaced the voice-coil actuator with a less expensive stepper motor -- a
motor that rotated in small, discrete steps that corresponded exactly to the
spacing of tracks on the disk's surface. Other manufacturers of the period
experimented with other technologies as well, such as torque motors and rack &
pinion gearing, in an effort to achieve the precision needed to position heads
exactly over the right track on the disk, as inexpensively as possible.
By 1986 it had become clear that there were limits to the recording density
achievable with stepper and torque motor actuators. The reason was that they
moved the head across the disk surface in pre-determined steps. The drive, in
essence, had to "assume" that a new track of data would be exactly beneath the
head when it took a step. Because disks could expand or contract when they
changed temperature, however, this track-per-step alignment became impossible
to achieve unless tracks of data on the disk were spaced sufficiently far apart.
The industry ultimately had to abandon alternative motors, and standardized on
voice coil actuators, which could move in continuous increments. This
permitted drive makers to build closed-loop feedback systems into the drives, so
that heads could be continuously and precisely repositioned above the correct
tracks, as the drives expanded and contracted with temperature; were bounced
and jostled; and so on. Table 1 shows that although 42% of all new drives
introduced in 1982 used stepper motors, by 1987 the vast majority had reverted
back to the voice coil motor. In virtually every case, drives with voice coil
motors by 1987 also employed one of two methods for closed-loop feedback, that
enabled the continuous repositioning of heads over desired tracks. The
standardization on voice coil technology with closed-loop continuous
adjustment systems contributed strongly to the industry's ability to move from
450 concentric tracks of data per inch of disk radius achievable with stepper
motors in 1983, to 4,500 tracks per inch in 1994.
A dominant mechanical design of the actuator mechanism also emerged
over this period. Until 1978 the heads were inserted and withdrawn in a straight
line along the radius of the disk in what was called a linear actuator design.
Designers' desire to shrink the physical size of drives made this design infeasible,
however, and by 1985 a rotary design -- where the heads swung across the disk's
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surface like the arm of a phonograph, with one end of the arm fixed -- became
standard. Table 1 shows that the linear design had essentially disappeared by
1986.
3.4 Embedded Intelligent Interface Electronics
Until 1983, the interface between most drives and their host computers
was governed by a separate circuit card, often supplied to the computer
manufacturer or disk drive maker by a third party. This was the year in which
Quantum Corp. announced the first drive with an intelligent SCSI (Small
Computer Standard Interface) control circuit, all integrated onto a single silicon
chip that was embedded within the drive. Intelligent drive electronics (IDE)
such as SCSI enabled an array of performance enhancements, such that no drive
could be performance-competitive without them. These features included:
1. The rate at which data could be transferred to and from the computer no
longer was constrained by the speed of rotation of the disks;
2. Codes could be incorporated into the drive that could detect and correct errors;
3. The location of any defects on the surface of the disk could be mapped, and the
drive could then be self-programmed not to store data on any defective location;
and
4. The density of data could be made more consistent across the disk's surface.
Before IDE, drives wrote data at a constant clock rate. On the rotating disk,
however, the outer tracks moved beneath the heads at a much faster speed than
the tracks closest to the disk's center. As a consequence, data was written much
more sparsely on the outer tracks than the inner ones. IDE permitted drives to
vary the rate at which they wrote data, to account for differences in the speed at
which tracks of varying distances from the center of the disk passed beneath the
head. As Table 1 shows, virtually all drives in the industry introduced after 1987
employed embedded intelligent controllers.
The emergence of a dominant design in the disk drive industry was a
process that spanned a decade -- it was not a discrete event. The evolution
toward the dominant design, however, rapidly gained momentum in 1980, and
by 1983 the first model incorporating all features of today's dominant design had
been announced. Although the four innovations comprising the dominant
design were contributed by four different firms -- IBM, Shugart, Seagate and
Quantum -- the first model in the industry to embody all elements of the
dominant disk drive design in a single model was announced in 1983 by yet a
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different firm, Maxtor, that had just entered the industry. Table 1 shows how the
rest of the industry's design efforts coalesced around that paradigm within the
few years thereafter.
Of course, innovations in disk drive technology continue at a furious pace.
The architecture has shrunk dramatically, from disks that were 14 inches in
diameter in 1973 to 1.8 inches today. The speed of the pancake motors has
increased from 3600 revolutions per minute (RPMs) in 1980 to 7200 RPMs today.
The technologies employed in the design and manufacture of recording heads
have changed, and continue to change, dramatically. And the intelligence
programmed into the drives' controller chips has increased their reliability and
speed dramatically. All of these improvements, however, are achieved at the
component level, within the fundamental design parameters that now
constitute a dominant disk drive design.2
4. Hypotheses
Our previous work marks the starting point of the hypotheses we test in
this paper. Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and Sudrez and Utterback (1995)
propose and give support to the idea that the survival of firms is affected by the
technological evolution of the industry. In particular, they propose that the
emergence of a dominant design will mark a clear milestone in the competitive
landscape of an industry. The period after a dominant design would be a period
of rapid decrease in the number of firms in the industry in which many firms
will have to leave the business because the dominant design allows for the
exploitation of economies of scale and other entry barriers and competitive
hurdles (see Utterback and Sudrez 1993). Consi3tent with this argument, Sudrez
and Utterback found statistical support for their hypothesis that the hazard
profile of pre-dominant design entrants was lower than that of post-dominant
design entrants.
Indeed, the nature of competition in the disk drive industry changed
dramatically after the dominant design began to coalesce in the mid-1980s. Prior
to its emergence, industry volumes were less than 2 million units in 1984. By
1990 annual volumes over 25 million units had become typical. Product design
cycles that averaged about 30 months prior to the advent of the dominant design
got compressed to twelve months. Average cost per megabyte fell in constant
2 In defining this dominant disk drive design in this way, we do not claim that this is a
permanent dominant design. New technologies, combined with the demands of new markets,
could in the future render the current design obsolete and lead to the emergence of another, more
effective technology. In such a case, we would expect the patterns of survival and failure to
repeat themselves, in the manner described below.
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dollars from about $22 in 1984 to $3.30 in 1990. And most significantly, prior to
appearance of the dominant design, a host of competitors with very different
manufacturing cost capabilities were able to coexist, because the lack of
standardization in product features created substantial variety in market
segmentation -- creating niches where high-cost competitors could be relatively
protected. In 1984, for example, the difference in the cost of making a 20MB
drive differed by as much as 40% between the largest and 5th largest producer. In
1990, after the dominant design had coalesced, differences between the
manufacturing costs of the largest and fifth largest producers had narrowed to
less than 5%. Product standardization lowered boundaries to mobility across
market segments. As a consequence, price- and time-based competition had
become severe (Christensen, 1995).
Several authors have raised concerns about the validity of the dominant
design model, particularly for new, fast-changing industries, such as the disk
drive industry (Teece, 1986). The data available for this industry allows us to
directly test the dominant design hypotheses--together with many others--as we
can trace firm by firm and year by year the models produced and the technologies
employed in each model. In the previous section we identified four elements of
the dominant design in this industry, and we assembled data on the use of each
of these four components, year by year and firm by firm. Following the logic of
the dominant design framework, we hypothesize that firms which incorporated
these elements of dominant design in their new products will have experienced
a lower probability of failure that those which did not even in a fast changing
industry such as disk drives.
We also hypothesize that here might be entry timing issues that may be
unique to fast-changing industries. Scholars who have examined the relation
between entry timing and survival have generally found that early entrants
have an advantage (Foster, 1986; Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 1987). Previous
work by Suarez and Utterback (1995) tended to support this idea, dividing data
into pre- and post-dominant design entrants. This study of the fast-paced disk
drive industry, however, points to a different set of propositions. We
hypothesize the existence of a "window of opportunity" to enter the industry,
during the period just prior to the emergence of a dominant product design.
Firms that entered the industry during this short window tended to have a
lower probability of failure.
The reason is that in fast-paced industries, learning -- more precisely, the
timing of learning -- becomes critical. As the technology changes rapidly,
knowledge, and capabilities obsolesce more rapidly than in other industries.
This implies that capabilities and knowledge gained at earlier stages in an
industry's development may not be useful -- in fact may become liabilities -- in
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the competitive environment triggered by the emergence of a dominant design.
In the disk drive industry, there appears to have been a critical period just prior
to the emergence of the dominant design. Firms that entered during this period,
and established the capabilities for rapid product development and volume
manufacturing that came to characterize the industry, seem to have had a higher
probability of survival than firms whose capabilities were defined in a different
competitive environment.
Having described a window of opportunity to enter the market, our
proposition is that entering earlier or later with respect to this window will be
riskier, as it is implied by the discussion above. Firms entering too early will
miss the most attractive value network and spend resources in acquiring
knowledge which may become obsolete. Firms entering too late will have to face
the steep entry barriers that dominant-design producers have been able to raise,
in the form of economies of scale, brand name, manufacturing experience, and
so on. Our window of opportunity proposition could be seen as a departure
from common wisdom on entry timing, which claims that earlier entrants have
an advantage. However, we like to think of it as a "fine-tuning" of the entry
timing hypothesis which fits better the reality of fast-changing industries such as
hard disk drives.
Christensen (1993) has proposed that the technological choices made by a
firm when it enters the market also affects its posterior success or failure. In
particular, and building on Henderson and Clark (1990), he shows that firms
entering the disk drive industry based on an architectural innovation ended to
perform much better than those which entered the market based on component
innovation. He then notices that most of the architectural innovators in the
disk drive industry make their entry into new markets instead of established
ones. Entry into new markets allows them to avoid direct competition with
established firms and make progress in the new market segment until they are
strong enough to defy the established firms in the established markets.
Building on Christensen's work, here we test the hypothesis that the
technological and market strategy of a new entrant are highly interrelated, and
that their joint effect plays an important role on a firm's probability of survival.
In particular, we propose that firms which target new market segments with an
architectural innovation will tend to be more successful than those which target
existing markets or innovate in component technology, even after controlling
for all the competing predictors of survival.
We stress the fact that all our technology strategy hypotheses described
above should complement, not replace, other alternative explanations of
survival, such as the population ecology and standard economic or management
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approaches; indeed, as we will see below, we test for many of these alternative
approaches in this paper. The relative importance of each approach to firm
survival will change depending on the industry under study. Although we lack
enough data from different industries to prove it, we are inclined to believe that
in modern, fast-changing industries, technology strategy variables tend to
predominate when it comes to explain firm survival. As we will see, the hard
disk drive industry is a case in point.
5. Data
The data used in this study were taken from Disk/Trend Report, a market
research publication that has covered the disk drive industry since 1975. It
contains information on the dates of entry and exit for every firm worldwide
that announced its intention to introduce a disk drive model, whether it actually
produced one or not. It provides the technological and performance
specifications of each disk drive model that was ever announced by each of these
companies, together with the date on which the model was first shipped, if it was
in fact put into production. The data set also measures the revenues and unit
sales of each manufacturer, by market segment. It is a remarkably complete data
set for the industry -- not a sample of firms and products, but a complete census.
A comprehensive search of the trade publications covering the industry, as well
as personal interviews with over 90 industry executives, yielded information on
only one company that had not been included in the Disk/Trend database -- a
company that incorporated, but never was able to design and announce a
product (Christensen, 1993). Although Disk/Trend publishes data on the
markets for floppy and rigid or hard disk drives, only the rigid disk drive
industry was considered in the present study.
6. Method
Survival analysis, a set of statistical techniques developed in the biological
sciences to address the problem of censored data, have gained increasing
acceptance in the management literature. The cornerstone of survival analysis
is the hazard function, which gives the probability that a company will
experience an event in a small time interval--exit from the industry in any given
year, in our case. We have omitted basic descriptions of survival statistics in this
paper: Sudrez and Utterback (1995) present the basics of this technique in a
related application; more technical references may be found in Cox and Oakes
(1984).
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In a previous paper, Sudrez and Utterback (1995) used a Cox Proportional
Hazard model to test whether firms that entered before the dominant design had
different hazard profile from those that entered after the dominant design. Even
though Cox models are a widely-used tool in survival analysis, they have
several important limitations, the chief of them being the validity of the
proportional hazards assumption. Singer and Willett, both statisticians expert in
survival analysis, state "we have found that violations of the proportional
hazard assumption are the rule, not the exception" (Singer and Willett, 1991). In
addition, Cox survival models do not lend themselves easily to include time-
variant covariates.
In this paper we use a newer and more robust technique--known as
discrete survival analysis-- to calculate the hazard or probability of exiting the
industry. Discrete survival analysis does not require the proportional hazard
assumption and, as we will see, it allows a more intuitive presentation of the
results, and the inclusion of time-variant covariates (Willett and Singer,
forthcoming). The general model used in this paper can be written:
loge (hj/1-hj) = [alDi + a2D2 + ....ajDj] + [3X1 +82X2 ....... BpXp] (1)
where:
hj is the hazard at time j
D1 to Dj are dummy variables to denote the period that the record
references. There are as many dummies as there are time periods
in our data set.
X1 to Xp are covariates or predictors, which can vary over time
a and g, are parameters to be estimated
the previous equation is identical to:
hj = 1/ 1+ e -{[alD1 + D2D2 +....aiDj] + [1Xi +e2X2 .... BpXp]) (2)
which can then be fitted using standard logistic regression procedures (see
Willett and Singer, forthcoming, for details). In this way, we are able to retrieve
the hazard function without the use of dedicated software.
The disk drive industry data set is very comprehensive and thus allows
for the inclusion of many variables. Building on our previous work and the
literature on firm entry and survival, Table 2 contains a summary of the
variables we included or tested in our models:
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[insert Table 2 here]
We tested the significance of each variable listed here adding them one by
one--with no other covariates aside--to the most basic model, one which
contains only the time dummies. Table 3 shows a summary of such exercise:
variables that turned out non significant were dropped at this stage.
[insert Table 3 here]
Next, we formed a model with all variables that passed the first
significance test. From this model, we continued applying the decrement to Chi-
Square test, dropping one variable at a time from the model, and adding them
again if they turned out to be significant. This procedure allowed us to come to a
best-fitted model, where all variables left were significant at the 0.05 level or
better (plus one borderline case). This model is displayed in Table 4 and will be
discussed below.
7. Implications of the Significance Tests
The result of the careful approach to testing the significance of each
parameter, contained in Tables 3 and 4, allows us to make several interesting
observations about the usefulness of each stream of literature in explaining the
survival of firms in the disk drive industry.
Conventional economic variables. Conventional economic arguments
find limited support in our data. Only FIRMSALE, the variable measuring the
effect of firm size on survival was significant. The industry sales growth
variable does not even pass the first significance test, which means that there is
no relationship between the probability of failure of a firm and the industry rate
of growth. We also tried other economic variables (not reported in the Table),
such as industry concentration measures, and they turned out not to be
significant.
Population ecology variables. Population ecology postulates find no
support in our data. Both (DENSITY) and (INDSALES) variables fail to pass the
significance test. In other words, the probability of exiting the disk drive industry
does not depend on the number of active firms in the industry, nor on the size
of the industry in any given year.
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Technology Variables. Two of the five variables included in the final
model can be considered technology strategy variables. WINCHARC
(Winchester architecture) and INTERFAC (intelligent interface) are the key
architectural elements of the dominant product design. The two elements of the
dominant design which were component technologies -- PANCAKE and
ACTUATOR -- proved not to have statistically significant explanatory power in
the survival equation. These results suggest that the dominant design is defined
by the architecture of the product, rather than the individual components used
as modules within it. This is consistent with the findings of Henderson and
Clark (1990), Christensen (1992) and Iansiti (1995) that established firms have a
strong track record in continually improving component technologies -- even
radically new ones -- within the framework of a dominant product architecture.
Taken together, these findings suggest a modification to the dominant design
framework proposed originally by Utterback and Abernathy (1975). Whereas
they saw a shift in the focus of technology development from product design to
process improvement after a dominant design emerged, these findings suggest
that once a dominant architecture is in place, considerable technology
development may continue at the component level, as well as in manufacturing
processes.
Strategic Variables. The other two variables which proved to have
significant explanatory power are related to strategies the firms pursued.
ARCHNMKT, the variable describing how the entrants targeted their initial
product toward the market, emerged as a highly significant factor. Those
entrants whose entry product was architecturally innovative, and who deployed
that product in an emerging rather than established market segment, enjoyed a
much higher probability of survival. This supports the frameworks presented in
Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) and Christensen and Bower (1996), that a
firm's choice of which customers to serve has a powerful impact on the
capabilities it develops and the strategies it can pursue.
Of the variables measuring entry timing, LNRANK -- which was a rank-
ordering of the sequence of firms' entry into the over-all industry, failed the
significance test when added to the final model. In fact, LNRANK had a
negative sign -- indicating that later entrants would have a lower probability of
failure. Our alternative hypothesis, that entry too early might be
disadvantageous in situations where capabilities and knowledge rapidly become
obsolete, was supported in the significance of the WIND8083 variable (it showed
a better chi-square test).
VARIETY, which measured a firm's ability to produce multiple product
models at one time, is another variable that has attracted some attention in the
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management and population ecology literatures. It also failed the significance
test.
8. Interpreting the Results of the Best Fitted Model
The best fitted model is shown in Table 4. As we can see, only five
variables passed all the decrement to Chi-Square tests:
WINCHARC, one of the dominant design variables, which takes a value of 1 if a
firm used the Winchester architecture in its models, at any given year (0
otherwise).
INTERFAC, another dominant design variable, which takes a value of 1 if a firm
used embedded intelligent interface electronics at any given year (0 otherwise)
WIND8083, the window of opportunity for entry variable, takes a value of 1 if a
firm entered during the 1980-1983 period (0 otherwise).
ARCHNMKT, the entry strategy variable, takes a value of 1 if a firm entered a
new market with an architectural innovation (0 otherwise).
FIRMSALE, the firm size or economies-of-scale variable, measures the sales of a
firm per year in millions of dollars. The average annual firm sales for the
sample is $64 million.
[insert Table 4 here]
In order to interpret the results, consider first the sign of the five
significant predictors of survival. The negative sign for each of them indicates
that all are negatively correlated with the probability of failure. That is:
* the probability of failure is reduced if a firm was using each of these two
elements of the dominant design: Winchester architecture or embedded
intelligent electronics interface. Firms which did not adopt these two design
features--i.e. did not adopt the dominant design--have a higher probability of
failure.
* the probability of failure is reduced if a firm entered the industry during the
period 1980-1983 (inclusive). This supports our hypotheses that in fast-
changing industries such as this, there may be a short "window of opportunity"
to enter the market. We believe this window to exist during the few years prior
to the crystallizing of the dominant design, and these results lend support to
our proposition.
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* the probability of failure is reduced for firms that enter the industry targeting a
new market segment--different from the established market dominated by the
existing firms-- with an architectural innovation. Note from Table 3 that is the
combined effect of the ARCHINNO and NEWMKT variables (i.e.
ARCHNMKT) which has the strongest effect (largest decrease in Chi-Square).
* the probability of failure is reduced for larger firms, when large is measured in
terms of sales. For the calculations of the hazard profiles below, a "baseline"
(small) firm was found to be one selling $30 million/year, whereas a typical
large firm has sales of $150 million/year.
Table 5 below and its companion Figures 2 to 5 help us interpret the
results and see the effect of each covariate on the hazard pattern. The table
describes five different scenarios or situations for which we calculated the hazard
function. The baseline scenario (i) assumes a firm that did not use either of the
dominant design, did not enter the industry during the window 1980-1983, did
not focus on a new market with an architectural innovation, and had a small
size (sales of $30 million/year). Then, in scenarios (ii) to (v), we change the
value of one covariate at a time, in order to see the effect of that covariate in the
hazard profile (see table). Substituting these numbers in equation (2) results in
h(t)--the hazard at year t. Figures 2 to 5, graphically show the effect of each
predictor on the hazard profile.
[insert Table 5 here]
The Figures are quite eloquent. First, consider only the baseline curve in
Figure 2; its shape and level are a striking indication of the consequences of
following a wrong strategy. Given the way we have defined the baseline in Table
5, our baseline firm follows a "dumb" strategy: does not adopt the dominant
design, does not enter the industry in the advantageous time window and when
it enters, it probably does so targeting the established markets --where the
incumbent firms are strong-- without the advantage of an architectural
innovation. It does not even have the advantage of a large size. A firm with
such a strategy is very likely to fail soon, as we see by looking at the baseline
curve. Such a firm has almost an 0.9 probability of failure during the first year in
the market, and that propensity to fail continues every year for almost all the
data period, making it extremely unlikely that a firm with the baseline strategy
will survive.
In Figure 2 it is also easy to see that firms which followed the dominant
design -- i.e. firms that used both Winchester drive architectures and embedded
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intelligent electronic interfaces--had a clearly lower hazard profile than those
firms of the baseline model. Indeed, the positive shift in the hazard profile is
larger for these covariates than for any other variable in the model, which
suggests that in fast-paced industries such as the hard disk drive, adopting the
dominant design features is crucial for survival.
A positive shift (down) in the hazard profile can also be found in Figure 3:
firms that entered during the 1980-1983 window present a much lower
probability of failure than firms entering in a different time period. For
instance, while a firm entering during the 1980-83 window had a probability of
0,67 of leaving the industry during its fifth year of business (see figure), the same
probability for a firm that entered in a different period was 0,85.
Figure 4 shows how choosing an appropriate combination of innovation
and entry market can significantly reduce a firm's probability of failure.
Architectural innovators entering into new markets present a much lower
hazard than baseline firms. For example, note from the Figure that the
probability of failure for a baseline firm during its sixth year of business is 0.83,
whereas it is only 0.64 for a firm which is an architectural innovator entering a
new market.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the effect of larger size on survival. Our baseline
firm is five times smaller than our "large" firm. This later firm, with sales of
$150 million/year has a hazard profile that is significantly more benign than the
baseline firm: while the baseline firm had a probability of failure of more than
0.8 during its seventh year of life, the same probability was about 0.4 for a large
firm.
[insert Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 here]
9. Concluding Remarks
Our results have important implications for understanding firm survival
and strategy-making in fast-paced industries, and point toward a number of
potentially fruitful avenues for further research.. They suggest that in such
industries managerial decisions explain a great part of an entrant's later success
or failure. Based on the evidence in this research, a firm entering an industry
such as the disk drive industry should carefully study its timing decision
(relative to the emergence of the dominant design); look for opportunities to
participate in the creation of new value networks, rather than enter established
markets; and adopt the architectural elements of the dominant design as rapidly
as possible, after they begin to coalesce in the industry. Managers that take these
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actions appropriately will dramatically reduce their companies' probability of
failure through the years. Certainly, as other scholars have shown, factors
outside the control of the firm can have a significant impact on a company's
fortunes; indeed, they may significantly shape the sorts of strategies management
can pursue (Christensen & Bower, 1996). Nonetheless, these results suggest that
the firm's own decisions and strategy matter greatly.
The fact that we considered several elements of technology strategy in our
model, permits us to build upon previous studies that have examined each of
these elements separately. For instance, Christensen's earlier work has stressed
that the leaders of one generation of disk drives tended not to remain as leaders
for the next generation. The interrelationship between this idea and that of a
dominant design in the industry may imply that Christensen's findings could be
most applicable for the period before the dominant design. In a post-dominant
design period it may be possible for a few dominant firms to stay as leaders for
several generations. This hypothesis finds support in the disk drive industry
after 1983.
Our results also point toward certain improvements or modifications
needed in other existing frameworks. In particular, the analysis suggests that
"first-mover advantages" and most of the postulates of the entry timing
literature may not hold true in fast-changing industries. Entry timing still has
something to tell us about the success or failure of firms in these industries, but
in a different way. We suggest the existence of a "window of opportunity" may
be a more accurate way of conceptualizing the importance of entry timing in fast-
paced industries -- rather than simply first-mover advantages.
We also provide a clearer definition of the idea of a dominant design or
standard, which may guide future research in this field. By tracing the main
technical elements of a dominant design and their evolution over time, we have
been able to determine more rigorously what it is and how it emerges -- thus
departing from noisier measures, such as the use of model sales or other non-
technology constructs. Moreover, according to our propositions here, the
dynamics of how a dominant design emerges should directly affect the size,
temporal location and duration of the window of opportunity to enter an
industry. Further research is needed to shed more light on this important
relationship.
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APPENDIX 1: A BRIEF PRIMER ON HOW DISK DRIVES WORK
Rigid disk drives are comprised of one or more rotating disks -- polished
aluminum platters coated with magnetic material -- mounted on a central
spindle. Data is recorded and read on concentric tracks on the surfaces of these
disks. Read/write heads -- one each for the top and bottom surfaces of each disk
on the spindle, are aerodynamically designed to fly a few millionths of an inch
over the surface of the disk. They generally rest on the disk's surface when the
drive is at rest; "take off" as the drive begins to spin; and "land" again when the
disks stop. The heads are positioned over the proper track on the disk by an
actuator motor, which moves the heads across the tracks in a fashion similar to
the arm on a phonograph. The head is essentially a tiny electromagnet which,
when current flows in one direction, orients the polarity of the magnetic domain
on the disk's surface immediately beneath it. When the direction of current
through the electromagnet reverses, its polarity changes. This induces an
opposite switch of the polarity of the adjacent domain on the disk's surface as the
disk spins beneath the head. In this manner, data is written in binary code on
the disk. To read data, changes in magnetic field on the disk as it spins beneath
the head are used to induce changes in the direction of current--essentially the
reverse process of writing. Disk drives also include electronic circuitry enabling
computers to control and communicate with the drive.
As in other magnetic recording products, areal recording density
(measured in megabits per square inch of disk surface area, or mbpsi) was the
pervasive measure of product performance in the disk drive industry.
Historically, areal density in the industry has increased at a steady 35% annual
rate. A drive's total capacity is the product of the available square inches on the
top and bottom surfaces of the disks mounted on the spindle of the drive,
multiplied by its areal recording density. Historically, the capacity of drives in a
given product architecture has increased at about 50% annually. The difference
between the 35% increase in areal density and the 50% increase in total capacity
has come from mechanical engineering innovations, which enable
manufacturers to squeeze additional disks and heads into a given size of drive.
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Table 2. Variables tested out during the modeling
Variable Description Rationale
LEAVE Takes a value of 1 the year a the dependent variable
firm exits the industry. 0
otherwise
DENSITY number of firms active in the Population ecologists argue
industry each year that it is directly correlated with
probability of failure (e.g.
Carroll and Hannan 1989)
WINCHARC a dummy variable with value one of the four components of
=1 if firm was using the the dominant design
winchester drive architecture
at any given year
ACTUATOR a dummy variable with value one of the four components of
=1 if firm was using the rotary the dominant design
voice coil actuator motor at
any given year
PANCAKE a dummy variable with value one of the four components of
=1 if firm was using the under the dominant design
spindle pancake motor at any
given year
INTERFAC a dummy variable with value one of the four components of
=1 if firm was using embedded the dominant design
intelligent interface electronic
at any given year
VARIETY total number of different higher variety or mix
models (8, 51/4, 31/2 inches, etc)flexibility makes a firm more
produced by each firm per year competitive (e.g. Sudrez,
Cusumano and Fine 1994)
ARCHINNO a dummy variable with value Christensen's work (1993)
= 1 if the firm was an suggests that architectural
architectural innovator, as innovators tend to be more
defined by Henderson and successful in this industry
Clark (1990)
NEWMKT a dummy variable with value Christensen's work (1994)
= 1 if the firm entered in a neA suggests that entrants to new
market as opposed to an markets tend to be more
established one successful.
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ARCHNMKT a dummy variable with value interaction between the two
= 1 if a firm was an previous variables.
architectural innovator and
entered a new market
INDSALES sales of the industry per year, population ecology think that
in millions of dollars a larger market can "feed"
more firms
FIRMSALE sales of a firm per year, in economists suggest the
millions of dollars existence of economies of scale
- larger firms have lower costs
ISLGROWT industry sales growth (%) per economists suggest that high-
year growth industries makes it
easier for a firm to stay in
business
LNRANK natural logarithm of entry first mover advantages
timing. Entry timing starts in concept in the management
1 for the first entrant, and so literature: early entrants
on would have an advantage
WIND8083 a dummy variable with value there may exist a window of
= 1 if a firm entered the opportunity to enter, just
industry during the 1980-1983 before the dominant design
time period, inclusive gets established
Table 3. Significance of the Variables when Included Individually in the Most
Basic Model (only time dummies)
Variable Decrement to X2 Significance (P-value)
DENSITY 0,12 not significant
WINCHARC 25,24 0,001
PANCAKE 6,16 0,02
ACTUATOR 0,92 not significant
INTERFAC 11,80 0,001
VARIETY 5,38 0,05
ARCHINNO 25,88 0,001
NEWMKT 36,67 0,001
ARCHNMKT 39,02 0,001
INDSALES 0,50 not significant
FIRMSALE 58,22 0,001
ISLGROWT 0,48 not significant
LNRANK 17,96 0,001
WIND8083 9,44 0,01
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Table 4. Best Fitted Model
Predictor Estimate St. error Significance Delta X2 *
D1_76 2,33 0,68
D2_77 2,36 0,65
D3_78 2,52 0,60
D4_79 2,27 0,55
D5_80 2,03 0,52
D6_81 1,92 0,54
D7_82 2,36 0,53
D8_83 2,39 0,55
D9_84 2,49 0,56
D10_85 2,22 0,55
D11_86 2,12 0,58
D12_87 2,59 0,66
D13_88 0,58 0,94
D14 89 -0,09 1,18
WINCHARC -1,16 0,40 0.01 9,21
INTERFAC -0,85 0,49 0,07 3,07
ARCHNMKT -0,66 0,25 0,01 6,88
WIND8083 -1,51 0,29 0,001 28,87
FIRMSALE -0,018 0,003 0,001 48,14
-2LL 440,65
* when dropped one at a time from full model
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Table 5. Four Scenarios to Illustrate the Impact of Covariates on Hazard
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SCENARIO WINCH INTER ARCH WIND FIRM
ARC FAC NMKT 8083 SIZE
(i) Baseline 0 0 0 0 30
(ii) Effect of dominant 1 1 0 0 30
design
(iii) Effect of entry 0 0 0 1 30
window
(iv) Effect of tech/mkt 0 0 1 0 30
entry strategy
(v) Effect of Firm Size 0 0 0 0 150
(Scale)
Figure 1. U.S. Producers of Winchester Drives, 1976-1989.
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Figure 2. Effect of Dominant Design on Hazard
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Figure 3. Effect of Entry Window (1980-1983) on Hazard
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Figure 4. Effect of Technology Entry Strategy on Hazard
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Figure 5. Effect of Firm Size on Hazard
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